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Abstract Competent decision-making is required for informed consent. In this
paper, I aim, from a phenomenological perspective, to identify the speciﬁc facets
of competent decision-making that may form a challenge to depressed patients.
On a phenomenological account, mood and emotions are crucial to the way in
which human beings encounter the world. More precisely, mood is intimately
related to the options and future possibilities we perceive in the world around us.
I examine how possibilities should be understood in this context, and how, in
depression, decision-making might be compromised. I suggest that, based on this
analysis, a speciﬁc emphasis and alertness in assessments of competence in
depressed patients is called for. In fact, close attention should be paid to the range
of future possibilities depressed patients are able to perceive. In addition, pro-
viding environmental cues to these patients might be one way of enhancing their
decision-making capacity. The practical suggestions arrived at are open to
empirical research.
Keywords Depression  Mood  Competence  Decision-making  Possibilities 
Phenomenology
Introduction
As a general principle, doctors are required to obtain the informed consent of their
patients before beginning treatment. Valid informed consent is only obtainable
after the appropriate information has been disclosed to a competent patient [1–3].
Generally, four abilities are deemed necessary for (competent) decision-making:
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relevant information; thirdly, the ability to appreciate one’s situation and the
consequences of the options; and ﬁnally, the ability to reason about treatment
choices [3, 4]. The MacCAT-T was developed as an assessment tool based on
these four domains relevant to competent decision-making [5]. The four domains
and the MacCAT-T have been considered suitable for identifying those who are
incompetent due to cognitive impairments, like various forms of dementia [6, 7].
However, there are doubts about whether this approach to competence is equally
helpful for evaluating competence in patients suffering from other mental
disorders.
One of these disorders is major depression. Abraham Rudnick argues that while
major depression may not impair the four abilities generally considered necessary
for competence, it may ‘disrupt coherence of personal preferences by changing
them’ [8]. According to Rudnick, such a change may be assessed by comparing the
patient’s preferences during the depressive episode to his treatment preferences
during periods without depression. If current preferences are not consistent with
earlier treatment preferences in ‘normal’ periods then there is ground for treating the
patient as incompetent. In a paper on competence to consent to research, Carl Elliott
argued that it may well be that (severely) depressed patients are incompetent to
consent to research because, ﬁrst, it may be unclear whether their decisions are
authentically theirs, and second, some of these patients may not have sufﬁcient
concern for their own well-being [9]. Elliott, then, argues that assessments of
competence must take emotional factors into account. This suggestion is also put
forward by Louis Charland [7, 10] with respect to competence assessments in
general (see the ‘Implications’ section below; see also [11]). End of life decisions is
one speciﬁc area in which the issue of competence in depression is considered
relevant [12].
The reported percentage of depressed patients who are actually considered not to
be competent with respect to treatment decisions varies. Depending on the type of
assessment (either MacCAT or clinical assessment by the attending physician),
Jochen Vollmann et al. found impaired competence in 2.9% (physician assessed) or
20.0% (MacCAT) of the patients with depression [13].
1 Furthermore, Gareth Owen
et al. observed a ‘striking’ relationship between mood and decision-making capacity
in psychiatric inpatients [15]. Depressed mood in nonpsychotic disorders turned out
to be strongly associated with incapacity. On a conceptual level, the question is
about how to conceive of the challenges faced by depressed patients when it comes
to deciding between treatment options. The mere assertion that emotions play a role
may not be sufﬁcient from this conceptual viewpoint; rather, an understanding is
needed about the nature of the link between emotions and the decision-making
process.
In this article, I aim, from a phenomenological perspective, to identify the
speciﬁc facets of competent decision-making that form a challenge to (severely)
depressed patients. Following phenomenological accounts by, among others,
Matthew Ratcliffe [16], Michael Wheeler [17], and Martin Heidegger [18], I argue
1 See Young et al. [14] for four case studies on depression and competence.
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2
This calls for a speciﬁc emphasis and alertness in assessments of competence in
these patients. I also propose that phenomenological theorizing—especially
Wheeler’s account—suggests the means of supporting depressed patients when
making treatment decisions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the phenomenological
context of highlighting the topic of perceiving possibilities in people with mood
disorders is discussed. Then, in the section following, I relate this analysis to the
theoretical debate on competence. In the ﬁnal section, possible implications of the
analysis so far with respect to actual assessments of competence are explored.
Phenomenology: Perceiving possibilities and mood
Perceiving possibilities
From a phenomenological perspective, particularly drawing on a Heideggerian
analysis, human existence is to be understood from the start as being-in-the-world
[18]. This conceptual approach is meant to provide a different angle on human
functioning than, for example, a Cartesian Ego (see [17, pp. 18–19]). It implies that
human beings are, from the start, conceived of as being in interaction with the
world. In fact, the world has already been implicated in our self-appreciation or self-
awareness; there is no self without a world.
The interesting point is how this interaction is understood from a conceptual
point of view. What is the way in which we relate to other worldly entities? What is
the fabric of being-in-the-world made of? According to Ratcliffe, it is the concept of
possibility. This concept is directly derived from Heidegger’s early work [16].
Human agency
3 is approached, step by step, in terms of possibility, or being-
possible. The world as it surrounds us is not a world of objects that we encounter in
some detached appreciation. Rather, when we engage the objects, we have already
appreciated and perceived the possibilities provided by them. A famous example is
the analysis of our relationship to a hammer [18, p. 98]. It is not the case that a
person engages it as a ‘thing’ with a wooden component and an iron part, etc.; it is
in fact something with which he can hammer. He perceives something that provides
the possibility of ‘hammering’. In our everyday engagement, we interpret the
‘objects’ primarily as making certain actions possible. When we are involved in the
process of building, for instance, we pick up the materials that seem ﬁt for the job
2 In this article, I will not distinguish between mood and emotions. In Being and Time, Heidegger
basically uses the term Stimmung (mood), yet he also uses the term Beﬁndlichkeit which is hard to
translate but clearly refers to the affective dimension of being-in-the-world (see also Ratcliffe [16,
p. 308]). With respect to the distinction between mood and emotion, Ratcliffe writes, ‘I treat moods as a
speciﬁc sub-class of emotions. Heidegger’s discussion focuses on moods. However, I will suggest in what
follows that his theory can be generalized to encompass emotions more generally’ [16, p. 308]. I agree
with Ratcliffe that such a generalization is possible.
3 In technical terms, ‘being-there’ (Dasein). Wheeler uses the term ‘human agency’ and ‘the human
agent’ [17, p. 122].
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practice related possibilities. As Svenaeus puts it, ‘The most basic access [to things
in the word] … relies on our handling the stuff of the world in various ways to attain
things. The chair is not ﬁrst and foremost an object with such-and-such a shape and
colour; it is something to sit on, and we approach it in such a way when we take a
seat or offer it to somebody else in inviting her for a cup of coffee. The world …
does not consist of objects but of ‘‘tools’’…’[ 19, p. 182]. Notably, engaging the
world is certainly not limited to objects or tools, but instead, reaches out to include
the other people that we encounter. Recognizing the world, i.e., our surroundings,
from this possibility-perspective is not something we can turn off. It is both natural
and intrinsic to the way we are.
It is important to acknowledge two elements in the perception of possibilities.
First, there is not just one possibility attached to a hammer. For instance, a hammer
can be used to hammer. But the hammering itself is part of a broader scope of
possibilities, namely to ﬁx things and to build. And building, in turn, entails the
possibility of constructing a house. Furthermore, constructing a house implies the
possibility of shelter for a person (the builder himself). So, possibilities do not stop,
but go on inﬁnitely. Every possibility opens up a ﬁeld of further possibilities.
According to Wheeler, the human agent ‘confronts every concrete situation in
which she ﬁnds herself … as a range of possibilities for acting…’[ 17, p. 122;
emphasis added]. These possibilities, of course, are not always explicit, and we are
not actively aware of all these possibilities [17]. We know that when we arrive in
New York City there will be endless possibilities, but we surely are not consciously
aware of each of them. Since it is not just about one possibility but a range of
(interrelated) possibilities, Wheeler uses the term involvement-networks: ‘the
hammer is involved in an act of hammering; that hammering is involved in making
something fast; and that making something fast is involved in protecting the human
against bad weather’ [17, p. 145]. Now, there are all kinds of involvement-networks
to which there is some profound unity. Wheeler understands the unity of all
involvement-networks as an ‘involvement whole’, ‘a global structure of which
involvement-networks (contexts of activity) are local substructures’ [17, p. 147]. So,
engagement with the world consists, at a fundamental level, of an involvement
whole, and possibilities are the ﬁbers forming the fabric of this ‘whole’.
Another way of putting some of this is that we have a profoundly action-oriented
attitude towards our environment [17]: the environment is perceived from the
perspective of potential ranges of actions.
4 As Maurice Merleau-Ponty says,
‘[c]onsciousness is in the ﬁrst place not a matter of ‘‘I think that’’ but of ‘‘I can’’’
[22, p. 159].
The second aspect of possibilities is that they eventually relate to the person
himself. This was highlighted in the above example of the human agent engaged in
building a house for his own shelter. Possibilities are not free ﬂoating things that
‘may happen’ in the future, but they refer either directly or indirectly to the agent
4 Some link Heidegger’s theory of possibilities to Gibson’s theory of affordances [20], as directly
perceived possibilities [21]. Affordances, as a technical term, refers to the possibilities offered by the
environment to an animal.
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himself makes Wheeler consider them to be ‘egocentric’.
5 The formal structure of
the whole of these involvement networks, which refers to the agent himself, is the
‘worldhood’, ‘a formal pattern of organization’ [17, p. 147].
6 It is in these terms that
Heidegger describes the nature of human agency, which is characterized by an
openness (disclosedness, Erschlossenheit) to the world. Frederik Svenaeus under-
stands the openness of the human being as a striving for meaning: ‘This openness is
a form of hospitality toward the world—a constant striving to ﬁnd a place for new
phenomena in the meaning pattern, in order to make sense of them’ [23, p. 162].
Mood, possibilities, and online engagement
The fact that perceiving possibilities is fundamental to human existence does not
entail that it cannot be affected or changed. Heidegger emphasizes that this
possibility-recognizing character of our existence is always taking place in some
mood [18]. Mood is something which, like the possibility-character of our being, is
always there. We may be happy, sad, or even depressed, but there is always some
mood in which we encounter the world. And our mood is profoundly related to the
actual possibilities we perceive. Heidegger’s analysis of the concept of anxiety
emphasizes the central role of mood and emotions in our perception of the world
and the possibilities it provides [18, pp. 319–335]. In his conception of anxiety,
there are no longer signiﬁcant possibilities left; everything appears to be without
(concrete) meaning.
In other words, our moods and emotions are never-to-be-ignored phenomena in
the way we disclose the world and the possibilities and options for ourselves. The
role of mood and emotions in our engagement with the world (including other
human beings) has been emphasized in the work of Matthew Ratcliffe, drawing not
only on Heidegger but also on the work of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
Ratcliffe says, ‘Emotions, and more speciﬁcally moods, are philosophically central
for Heidegger. They are not merely ‘‘subjective’’ or ‘‘psychic’’ phenomena but an
irreducible pre-theoretical background, relative to which the world and the manner
in which we are situated within it is disclosed or rendered intelligible’ [24, p. 287].
And the way in which the world is intelligible to us is primarily in terms of actual
perceived possibilities. Based partly on neuroscientiﬁc research, but primarily
drawing on a phenomenological account, Ratcliffe states, ‘Emotions are neither
constituents of explicit intentionalities nor wholly distinct from intentional states.
They are a background that serves to structure explicit intentionalities and
determine the possible scope of intentional acts and objects, the way in which the
world is disclosed’ [24, p. 302]. The nature of the engagement with the world takes
place through a certain emotional state, which is fundamentally relevant to the
5 Within the context of the ontological project of Being and Time, it is important that the possibilities also
involve understanding of Dasein’s own being or existence [18].
6 The possibilities are not always self-evident. It might very well be that we encounter things for which it
is not clear what sort of possibilities they entail (related concepts in Heidegger [18] are Vorhandenheit
and Unzuhandenheit). It might take time to ﬁnd out the things an object enables us to do. However, the
usual way in which we relate to the world is by perceiving possibilities.
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relationship of engagement with the world and its tools could mean with respect to
depression: any profound disturbance of a person’s mood could have a serious
impact on the way the world and possibilities are perceived.
Ratcliffe quotes various people suffering from mental disorder who express their
changed perception and appreciation of the world. An interesting example with
respect to depression is his citation of William James’s quote of a melancholic
patient: ‘‘‘I see, I hear!’’ such [melancholic] patients say, ‘‘but the objects do not
reach me, it is as if there were a wall between me and the outer world!’’’ [16, p. 229]
Such accounts can be understood, of course, in terms of derealization, but it would
be interesting to approach them from the perspective of my analysis so far. For such
an experience might also be understood as resulting from the fact that the
possibilities for action normally provided by engagement with the objects (and
people) in the world have somehow drained away. So, the objects are there, but the
perception of these objects as disclosing ﬁelds of possibilities has changed. If these
practical possibilities have in fact drained away, then people might indeed feel, as
William James says, that they are ‘sheathed in india-rubber; nothing penetrates to
the quick or draws blood, as it were’ [25, p. 298].
While Ratcliffe emphasizes emotion or mood in the way people perceive
possibilities, Wheeler enters the debate from a different angle—the philosophy of
artiﬁcial intelligence (AI)—emphasizing the fact that one’s engagement with the
world is an ongoing adaptive process with continuous and new action oriented
perception [17].
7 He considers this engaged attitude toward the world to be a form
of ‘online’ intelligence: ‘A creature displays online intelligence just when it
produces a suite of ﬂuid and ﬂexible real-time adaptive responses to incoming
sensory stimuli’ [17, p. 12].
8 It is clear that this formulation does not only apply to
robots and cyborgs; it, rather, shows a basic view of how both robots and organisms
(humans included) relate to their environment. This online interaction is especially
relevant in a world that is in constant ﬂux—like the world we live in. In order to
move forward either as a human being or as a robot, it is necessary to be able to
continuously perceive new possibilities, as opposed to working with a ﬁxed
cognitive map of the world. Wheeler explains that approaching the interaction of
creatures with the environment from this online perspective has been helpful to
artiﬁcial intelligence. While traditionally, robots were indeed equipped with some
sort of ﬁxed map enabling them to engage the world, recent research proves the
utility of an online interactive approach to AI. It is important to note that Wheeler is
not so much interested in distinguishing online and ofﬂine intelligence as he is in
emphasizing the importance of online intelligence and interaction, which has often
been ignored in AI. In my interpretation of Wheeler’s account, I emphasize (see the
7 Both Ratcliffe and Wheeler emphasize the role of the body. The centrality of the body is directly related
to Merleau-Ponty (see, e.g., [22, pp. 159ff.]). Meanwhile, the body is absent in Heidegger [18]. A
difference between Ratcliffe and Wheeler is that while emotions are central to Ratcliffe’s account, they
are not to Wheeler’s.
8 Wheeler is well aware of the fact that some of his interpretations might be at odds with some Heidegger
scholars working in a continental tradition, and he writes, ‘I apologize in advance to any Heidegger
scholars out there…’[ 17, p. 20].
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seem to be a rather detached—ofﬂine—activity, people have to rely on continuous
online perception of new possibilities or environmental cues.
Summarizing this section, human beings are characterized by an online, action-
oriented, mood-based perception of possibilities. How does this phenomenological
theory apply to depression and informed consent?
Competent decision-making about treatment options
People make numerous decisions every day, selecting from a manifold of
possibilities. We weigh the options and eventually (sometimes very quickly,
sometimes after weeks or months) make choices. Decisions about medical treatment
options are among the most important decisions we can be faced with. Treatment
options are in fact treatment possibilities. I propose that these treatment options be
understood as possibilities in the sense just explained: possibilities as disclosing
ﬁelds or ranges of other possibilities directly relevant to the individual patient.
I now turn to the general scheme for evaluating competence as provided by Paul
Appelbaum [4] to ﬁnd out to what extent ‘perceiving possibilities’ is relevant to this
conceptual framework of competence. As mentioned before, the four domains of
human functioning evaluated are:
(1) The ability to communicate a choice,
(2) The ability to understand the information,
(3) The ability to appreciate the situation and its consequences,
(4) The ability to reason about the treatment options.
Two of these domains (items 3 and 4) directly relate to the concept of
possibilities. The ability to appreciate the consequences of the situation (item 3)
entails an appreciation of the possible scenarios that may develop starting at the
point where the patient ﬁnds herself right now. It is crucial that the patient not just
understands the consequences in general or medical terms but that her understand-
ing at this point involves an appreciation of the consequences—possibilities—for
herself. These consequences, given the previous analysis, then, could be understood
as the range or ﬁeld of possibilities the current situation entails for the patient
herself. Ratcliffe’s phenomenological account shows that severely depressed
patients may be able to cognitively grasp what consequences might obtain in
general or medical terms, but the appreciation thus understood might be
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the changed mood.
With respect to item 4, the ability to appreciate possibilities, the same applies.
The consequences of the (various) treatment options as ﬁelds of possibilities being
disclosed might even be a greater challenge to the severely depressed patient. The
patient may well be able to reiterate the doctor’s information in terms of risks and
recovery rates, etcetera, but the patient may be unable to envisage herself playing in
the garden with her grandchildren again, and she may be unable to envisage the joy
this may provide to the children, herself, and her husband. Although the treatment
options themselves may be understood, appreciating the range of possibilities
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may be the real challenge for the severely depressed patient. Of course, such
appreciation might be more subtle than other changes due to mental disorder, like
completely forgetting the procedure proposed by a treating physician in cases of
dementia. Still, at least because of the importance of such decisions, consideration
of this kind of subtlety is, of course, called for.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the options presented to a
patient are usually not ordinary options; they are rather out of the ordinary. Often,
patients, confronted with decisions about treatment, will ﬁnd themselves in not
only a difﬁcult but also a new situation. In line with Wheeler’s account, these are
exactly the situations in which an ‘online’ interaction with the environment is
essential. In such situations, people cannot just rely on established, ﬁxed
cognitive/behavioral patterns, but will have to adapt to new, unforeseen
circumstances and their consequences. In fact, recognizing this aspect of
decision-making about treatment options reveals one of the weaknesses in
Rudnick’s proposal [8], which was mentioned in the introduction. In his view, in
such new and often unforeseen circumstances, people will make decisions in line
with the decisions they made earlier in their lives. If their decision is not
consistent with their earlier decisions, there is reason to treat depressed patients as
incompetent. Yet, I think it is fair to state that new situations may very well yield
new decisions and behavioral responses. People should be free to choose new
responses to the challenges they face. As Appelbaum puts it with respect to
competence, ‘Consistency with past behavior is a difﬁcult determination,
especially for unprecedented decisions (e.g., amputation); moreover, a consistency
standard [for competence] risks denying patients the right to choose differently
today than they have in the past’ [26]. So, to summarize, I argue that decisions
should result from online engagement with the current situation rather than being
in line with previous decisions.
Implications
Support for an emphasis on emotions
The phenomenological exploration so far clearly provides support for the emphasis
on the role of emotions in competent decision-making [7]. In general, it is
recognized that factors other than mere ‘cognitive’ skills contribute to decision-
making; as Franklin Miller and Donald Rosenstein point out, ‘the contributions of
mood, motivation and other mental processes on risk assessment and decision-
making are also pertinent’ [27, p. 285]. The further claim, made by Charland, is that
emotions are not (sufﬁciently) represented in the MacCAT-T. The analysis I
followed in the previous two sections does not provide grounds for determining
whether the MacCAT in practice provides sufﬁcient room for emotions. But it
shows that the effects of emotions, namely, on possibilities perceived, may well be
covered by the Appelbaum approach and the MacCAT.
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emotions themselves but about the nature of people’s engagement with the world
and the profound relationship between this engagement—understood as perceiving
possibilities—and mood. It shows that in evaluating how a patient deals with the
various decisional or behavioral responses to the treatment options, one has to keep
in mind that adaptive behavior (competent decision-making can be considered to be
an important, perhaps core, aspect of such behavior) requires the following three
things. Firstly, it needs an appreciation not just of possibilities but of ﬁelds or
networks of possibilities. Secondly, an appreciation with respect to the person
himself, in sum, with respect to the whole of this person’s involvement network, is
needed. And, thirdly, it needs an online engagement and interaction (not ﬁxed
cognitive or behavioral schemes). The severely depressed patient may understand
the necessity of an operation in order to live, but the problem is that the depressed
patient might be unable to envisage the ﬁelds of possibilities open to her should she
be operated upon. To be sure, she might perceive some of them, but the mental
condition might well affect this perception to an extent that it decisively inﬂuences
the eventual decision. Such a ‘decisive’ inﬂuence could, indeed, on closer
examination, imply that the patient should not be considered competent. In other
words, in such cases, a depressed patient’s autonomous decision-making has been
compromised. In sum, the phenomenological perspective emphasizes that mood and
emotions are fundamental to appreciating the world and the options open to us.
Therefore, severe mood disturbances may well lead to severe disturbances in the
appreciation of options, and consequently, may compromise decision-making to
an extent that the patient can no longer be considered competent to make the choice
at hand.
Decision-making capacity is always evaluated with respect to a speciﬁc treatment
choice [3]. So, while a patient might be able to make a competent decision about a
speciﬁc set of options, she might not be competent to make other kinds of decisions.
Therefore, it is always important to ﬁnd out whether the patient in her particular
situation is able to perceive the possibilities relevant to the choice to be made.
As indicated, it is in principle possible to integrate an assessment of these
three elements (range, self-relatedness, and online engagement/ﬂexibility) into a
‘MacCAT-approach’ to competence. Yet, there is also a role for speciﬁc attention,
focus, and alertness on the part of the assessor when evaluating a (severely)
depressed patient. In other words, the analysis so far does not result in new criteria
for competence, but calls for a focus or shift in understanding and application of
these criteria, at least when evaluating (severely) depressed patients.
9 Indeed, the
suggested approach is compatible with the MacCAT-T approach, just as long as its
components are not interpreted beforehand as merely covering rational understand-
ing in detached or medical terms of what will happen when a certain treatment
option is chosen. For instance, understanding that ‘if the surgery is postponed, I will
9 Recently, Jodi Halpern argued for the relevance of mood and emotions with respect to decision-making
capacity, introducing the concept of ‘concretized emotion-belief complexes’ [28]. It is interesting that
despite coming from a different philosophical background and moving along different lines of thought,
she still arrives at a comparable conclusion—that the speciﬁc relevance of emotions and emotional
disturbances in assessments of competence should be recognized.
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relevant question, according to the phenomenological account developed in this
article. A patient’s understanding of options should always be assessed with respect
to the patient’s particular situation, hopes, desires, and fears. Is the patient capable
of grasping what a particular choice will mean for the way her life could unfold? Of
course, nobody can be certain about the future, but the phenomenological account
implies that, nevertheless, we understand our world continuously in terms of
options, i.e., personalized possibilities—the things that I can do in interaction with
the environment (importantly, including loved ones). Our ongoing, online appre-
ciation of options is not a prediction about the future but the mental process that
enables us to shape our future.
Assessing and supporting patients’ appreciation of possibilities
As has become clear, emotions do not merely provide some color to our existence.
Instead, they are central to our appreciation of the world. On a practical level, in the
case of evaluating a depressed patient’s competence, this could mean asking her to
exactly specify the implications and opportunities the various treatment options
would entail for her in the future. Going home after an operation may sound to a
depressed person as a full stop, as the endpoint, while for others, going home after
an operation is a new beginning. This could be a way to assess the possibilities the
patient is able to appreciate and contemplate in the decision-making process. Such
possibilities are not merely fantasy. In fact, the phenomenological approach
suggests that our reality is built on the concrete possibilities we envisage. The
moment of winning 10 million Euros is great because of the concrete possibilities it
opens up.
This analysis highlights the relevance of an approach to competence that is at least
disorder-sensitive in the sense that various mental disorders might bring their own
speciﬁc challenges to decision-making. Interestingly, Jacinta Tan et al. studied
competence in a group of patients diagnosed with anorexia nervosa [29]. They found
that these patients were considered competent by the MacCAT-T. However, on
reﬂection, they concluded that these patients were not competent to make treatment
decisionsbecauseofadisease-relatedchangeconcerningtheirvalues.Inparallelwith
Tan et al., who employed empirical ethics research to show that speciﬁc attention for
values is called for in anorexia patients, I arrive, based on phenomenological
considerations, at the suggestion that the perception of ﬁelds of possibilities of
depressed patients deserves close attention. Depressed patients, just like anorexia
patients, may still possess many of the mental capacities needed for competent
decision-making, but subtle, disease-related changes might decisively inﬂuence their
decision-making. In fact, the outcome of the analysis so far is that even if formal
aspects of decision-making are intact in depressed patients, the material with which
the decision is being reached (the nature of the ﬁelds of options which are perceived)
may be changed, or more precisely, be not of the nature that would be required for
competent decision-making by this person in this particular situation.
Yet, there might also be another element to be derived from the analysis so far.
Wheeler emphasizes that cognitive functioning is in continuous, online interaction
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when applied to robotics—could also be relevant to decision-making about
treatment options. The online interaction means that people are permanently open to
environmental cues which enable them to adjust their planning, decision-making,
and behavior. In other words, provided with relevant cues, depressed patients may
be able to adjust their decision-making process. Pictures of children or, rather, the
actual presence of loved ones can perhaps provide the sort of cues that patients need
to better perceive possible consequences for themselves. Online perception of
relevant cues is the basis for any adaptation. People who have to decide about their
treatment while they stay in hospital may be deprived of many of their normal
environmental cues. Accommodating patients’ ongoing perception of (new) cues
might help them engage the world and confront the actual treatment decisions that
have to be made. This is also in line with Josephine Wong et al. who support a
‘functional approach,’ conceiving of competence from the perspective of an
‘interaction between the individual’s relevant abilities and the demands of the
particular decision-making task, implying that [decision-making] capacity may be
maximized by assisting the person to develop his or her relevant abilities and/or by
simplifying the task’ [30, p. 304]. Meanwhile, one has to note that online
responsiveness of severely depressed patients may be strongly diminished. Still,
Wheeler’s ‘online’ account suggests that efforts in this direction by care givers
could have a substantial effect. Such interventions might be considered related to
supportive environmental measures in people suffering from delirium [31]. Non-
pharmacological interventions that continuously provide cues about place, time,
and, e.g., the name of the nurse can help patients to remain in contact with reality
and can signiﬁcantly improve their condition.
10
The analysis so far has been conceptual in nature. Several strands of
phenomenology clearly indicate the relevance of looking in a speciﬁc way at the
challenges severely depressed patients may face when it comes to competent
decision-making. Yet, the implications mentioned in this section, regarding both the
actual assessments and methods for supporting the decision-making process are, in
my view, open to empirical research. In the terminology used by Shaun Gallagher
and Jesper Sørensen, such research requires ‘front-loading phenomenological
insights into experimental design’ [32]. This comes down to using phenomenolog-
ical insights in order to support empirical research—in this case, clinical research on
competence.
Since the structure of dealing with our world, as discussed earlier, is a basic
feature of human agency, it is reasonable to infer that other mental conditions may
also profoundly affect this engagement and, therefore, the perception of possibil-
ities. Yet, severe problems or challenges faced by patients suffering from some of
these conditions (e.g., dementia) are likely to become evident—even without
emphasizing the formal possibility-perceiving structure of people’s engagement
with the world. In depression, even as many capacities remain intact, the perception
10 The article is about depression. Yet, it might be helpful to look at manic episodes as well. During such
a period of time, patients may perceive all kinds of possibilities, envisage themselves in all kinds of
(positive) situations, and anticipate a multitude of outcomes. In other words, assessments of competence
in manic patients might also beneﬁt from a focus on the perception of possibilities.
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123of possibilities as understood in this analysis may have changed, which calls for a
speciﬁc focus when assessing competence in these patients.
Conclusion
In this article, I applied a phenomenological approach to the clinical question of the
speciﬁc challenges depressed patients may face when deciding about treatment
options. This approach yielded the following considerations. First, as human beings,
our understanding of the world takes the form of an online perception of
possibilities. In fact, this perception concerns ranges or networks of possibilities
rather than individual possibilities, and these networks of possibilities relate to us
and to our hopes, fears, etcetera. Second, the way we disclose these possibilities is
intimately related to our emotions or moods. These emotions are not a comple-
mentary sauce to our cognitive endeavors, but profoundly shape all our encounters
with the world. Third, affective disorders like depression, therefore, may
signiﬁcantly affect our understanding of the world, e.g., the future possibilities
we perceive and how we appreciate them. Fourth, the analysis, borrowing from
Wheeler’s recent work on artiﬁcial intelligence, suggests the importance of
continuous cues for our being in ‘online’ engagement with our surroundings. In
sum, these considerations support an emphasis on emotions as related to
(in)competence as well as the idea that different mental disorders may result in
speciﬁc challenges for patients as far as deciding about treatment options is
concerned. From a practical perspective, in actual assessments of competence in
severely depressed patients, the future possibilities these patients perceive should be
explored in some detail. In addition, providing environmental cues may be one way
of enhancing the decision-making capacities of these patients. These practical
implications are open to empirical research.
Acknowledgments This work was supported by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research,
Grant 275-20-016. I thank Leon de Bruin, Gerrit Glas, Josephine Lenssen, Derek Strijbos, and Sander
Voerman for their helpful suggestions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
1. Paterick, T.J., G.V. Carson, M.C. Allen, and T.E. Paterick. 2008. Medical informed consent: General
considerations for physicians. Mayo Clinic Proceedings 83(3): 313–319.
2. Nicholson, T.R., W. Cutter, and M. Hotopf. 2008. Assessing mental capacity: The mental capacity
act. British Medical Journal 336(7639): 322–325.
3. Beauchamp, T.L., and J.F. Childress. 2009. Principles of biomedical ethics. 6th ed. New York:
Oxford University Press.
4. Appelbaum, P.S. 2007. Clinical practice: Assessment of patients’ competence to consent to treat-
ment. New England Journal of Medicine 357(18): 1834–1840.
192 G. Meynen
1235. Grisso, T., P.S. Appelbaum, and C. Hill-Fotouhi. 1997. The MacCAT-T: A clinical tool to assess
patients’ capacities to make treatment decisions. Psychiatric Services 48(11): 1415–1419.
6. Welie, S.P.K. 2008. Criteria for assessment of patient competence: A conceptual analysis from the
legal, psychological and ethical perspectives. Davenport, IA: Fidlar Doubleday Inc.
7. Charland, L.C. 1998. Appreciation and emotion: Theoretical reﬂections on the MacArthur treatment
competence study. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8(4): 359–376.
8. Rudnick, A. 2002. Depression and competence to refuse psychiatric treatment. Journal of Medical
Ethics 28(3): 151–155.
9. Elliott, C. 1997. Caring about risks: Are severely depressed patients competent to consent to
research? Archives of General Psychiatry 54(2): 113–116.
10. Charland, L. 2008. Decision-making capacity. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/decision-capacity. Accessed Aug.16, 2010.
11. Breden, T.M., and J. Vollmann. 2004. The cognitive based approach of capacity assessment in
psychiatry: A philosophical critique of the MacCAT-T. Health Care Analysis 12(4): 273–283.
12. Gill, C.J. 2004. Depression in the context of disability and the ‘Right to die’. Theoretical Medicine
and Bioethics 25(3): 171–198.
13. Vollmann, J., A. Bauer, H. Danker-Hopfe, and H. Helmchen. 2003. Competence of mentally ill
patients: A comparative empirical study. Psychological Medicine 33(8): 1463–1471.
14. Young, E.W., J.C. Corby, and R. Johnson. 1993. Does depression invalidate competence? Consul-
tants’ ethical, psychiatric, and legal considerations. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2(4):
505–515.
15. Owen, G.S., A.S. David, G. Richardson, G. Szmukler, P. Hayward, and M. Hotopf. 2009. Mental
capacity, diagnosis and insight in psychiatric in-patients: A cross-sectional study. Psychological
Medicine 39(8): 1389–1398.
16. Ratcliffe, M. 2009. Understanding existential changes in psychiatric illness: The indispensability of
phenomenology. In Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives, ed. M.B.
Broome, and L. Bortolotti, 223–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Wheeler, M. 2005. Reconstructing the cognitive world: The next step. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
18. Heidegger, M. 2002. Being and time. Malden: Blackwell.
19. Svenaeus, F. 2010. What is an organ? Heidegger and the phenomenology of organ transplantation.
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31(3): 179–196.
20. Gibson, J.J. 1986. The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
21. Chemero, A. 2003. An outline of a theory of affordances. Ecological Psychology 15(2): 181–195.
22. Merleau-Ponty, M. 2005. Phenomenology of perception. Abingdon: Routledge.
23. Svenaeus, F. 2007. Do antidepressants affect the self? A phenomenological approach. Medicine,
Health Care and Philosophy 10(2): 153–166.
24. Ratcliffe, M. 2002. Heidegger’s attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion. Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences 1(3): 287–312.
25. James, W. 1890. The principles of psychology. Vol. 2. New York: Holt.
26. Appelbaum, P.S. 2008. Response on spike’s comment: Patients’ competence to consent to treatment.
New England Journal of Medicine 358(6): 644.
27. Miller, F.G., and D.F. Rosenstein. 2009. Psychiatric research. In Psychiatric ethics, 4th ed, ed.
S. Bloch, and S.A. Green. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28. Halpern, J. 2010. When concretized emotion-belief complexes derail decision-making capacity.
Bioethics. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01817.x.
29. Tan, J.O.A., P.T. Hope, D.A. Stewart, and P.R. Fitzpatrick. 2006. Competence to make treatment
decisions in anorexia nervosa: Thinking processes and values. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology
13(4): 267–282.
30. Wong, J.G., C.H. Clare, A.J. Holland, P.C. Watson, and M. Gunn. 2000. The capacity of people with
a ‘mental disability’ to make a health care decision. Psychological Medicine 30(2): 295–306.
31. Inouye, S.K., S.T. Bogardus Jr., C.S. Williams, L. Leo-Summers, and J.V. Agostini. 2003. The role of
adherence on the effectiveness of nonpharmacologic interventions: Evidence from the delirium
prevention trial. Archives of Internal Medicine 163(8): 958–964.
32. Gallagher, S., and J.B. Sorensen. 2006. Experimenting with phenomenology. Consciousness and
Cognition 15: 119–134.
Depression, possibilities, and competence 193
123